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and : Unrequited Faith Recruiting the CEF 1914-1918

Unrequited Faith
Recruiting the CEF 19 14 -19 18
ROBERT CRAIG BROWN &
DONALD LOVERIDGE
E d it o r ’s N ote: I f there is one book that signalled sustained academ ic
in terest in the F ir s t World W ar’s im pact on Canada it was C raig B ro w n
and R am say Cook, Canada 18 96-1921: A Nation Transformed (Toronto
1974). When P ro fesso r B ro w n undertook the p ro ject he was already at
work on his path-breaking biography o f S i r R o bert B o rd en , the w artim e
p rim e m inister, and he also produced a series of papers that have sim ilarly
endured as fo u ndation al studies. Am ong them was an exam ination of
conscription, fro m the p erspective of the in efficie n cies and then collapse
of volun teer recru itin g efforts of 19 14 -19 17 , that P ro fe sso r B ro w n co
authored with P hD candidate D onald M. L overidge. It appeared in a
1982 collection, edited by P ro fesso r D esm ond M orton, that m arked the
burgeoning work by C anadian historian s in m ilita ry subjects, and is still
a standard referen ce. The original publication had lim ited distribution,
and we were delighted when P ro fesso r B ro w n agreed to its republication.
It is rep rin ted here in its original form .

[Original introduction by Desmond Morton]: Few episodes in Canadian
history left more lasting scars on national unity than the Conscription
Crisis of 1917. Before the wartime government of Sir Robert Borden
invoked the Military Service Act to keep the Canadian Corps up to
strength, three years of recruiting campaigns had exhausted every
appeal to pride, patriotism, escape and shame. Most historians have
treated the recruiting campaigns as a mismanaged failure. Craig Brown
and Donald Loveridge have taken a second look at efforts which drew
half a million volunteers from a predominantly native born and rural
population of less than eight million.
© Canadian Military History 24, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 2015): 61-87
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In what is perhaps the first detailed, statistical analysis of
Canadian recruiting for the Canadian Expeditionary Force during
the First World War, Brown and Loveridge look closely at regional
variations, the role of the old militia and new voluntary agencies and
the factors which eventually drove the government to conscript men
for overseas service.

the
m o r n in g
of October 2, 1914 some thirty thousand
Canadian soldiers found themselves crowded into thirty ships
lying at anchor in Gaspe Basin, impatiently waiting the assembly of
warships which would escort them to war. Those on deck soon spotted
the imposing figure of Colonel Sam Hughes, Minister of Militia and
Defence, in full uniform, proceeding in a launch from ship to ship.
Colonel Sam, never one to miss an occasion for attention-grabbing,
was passing out thick bundles of his farewell message to his boys.
“ Soldiers” the valedictory proudly proclaimed, “ The world regards
you as a marvel.”
By now the men of the First Contingent were all too familiar
with Colonel Hughes’ penchant for exaggeration. Among them were
hundreds of recent immigrants who had served in the British army.
They, at least, knew that a few weeks of drill and rifle practice had
not made the Canadians into the efficient fighting force they would one
day be. The Minister’s message, the official historian of the Canadian
Expeditionary Force records, was received “with mixed feelings.”1
That did not matter to Hughes. His 900 word statement was
intended for another, more important, audience. Carefully worked
into the patriotic prose and inspirational verse was his account of the
miracle of Valcartier; how he, not quite single handedly, had created
a training camp on the sandy banks of Jacques Cartier River a few
miles from Quebec City and assembled there the eager volunteers
from the cities, towns and farms of Canada.

O

n

Within six weeks you were at your homes peaceful Canadian citizens.
Since then your training camp has been secured; three and a half miles of

1 Colonel A. Fortescue Duguid, Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great
War 19 14 -19 19 , vol. 1, 104. See also Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary
Force, 19 14 -19 19 , 31.
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rifle ranges— twice as long as any other in the world—were constructed;
fences were removed; water of the purist quality was laid in miles of
pipes; drainage was perfected; electric light was installed; crops were
harvested; roads and bridges were built; Ordnance and Army Service
Corps buildings were erected; railway sidings were laid down, woods
were cleared; sanitation was perfected so that illness was practically
unknown, and-thirty-three thousand men were assembled from points
some of them upwards of four thousand miles apart. You have been
perfected in rifle shooting and today are as fine a body— Officers and
Men— as ever faced a foe.2

Four years later, at 6:30 on the morning of November 11,
Canadian Corps Headquarters was advised that all hostilities would
cease at 1 1 a.m. At the appointed hour an unaccustomed, almost
eerie quiet settled over the lines. The first moment of victory was a
time for reflection. In England, a Canadian soldier, recuperating from
his wounds, wrote that “the people are taking the good news very
quietly. ... Nearly every family has lost someone, and a great many
two or three sons.”3 And, despite the joyous celebrations that erupted
from Halifax to Victoria a few hours later, so it must have been in
the hundreds of thousands of Canadian families which had sent one
or more of their boys to war.
So much had changed since Colonel Hughes had directed his
launch to and fro in Gaspe Basin. His original contingent had grown
into a Corps of four divisions and supporting arms, commanded, after
June 1917, by a civilian soldier from Canada, Lt. General Sir Arthur
W. Currie.4 Hughes himself was no longer Minister of Militia and
Defence, having been fired by the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Borden,
in November 1916. His Department was now run by Major General

2 Cited, Duguid, Official History, Appendices, no. 149, 122-23. For other accounts
of the chaos and the accomplishment of the training at Valcartier see Duguid,
Official History, chs. 1-2 , Nicholson, CEF, ch. II, and Robert Craig Brown, Robert
Laird Borden, A Biography, Vol. 2, 19 14 -19 3 7 , 12 -15 .
3 Nicholson, CEF, 482-84; Metro Toronto Library, Baldwin Room, Neil Family
Papers, “Harry” to “ Dear Bros and Sisters,” November 10, 1918.
4 On Currie see H.M. Urquhart, Arthur Currie: Biography of a Great Canadian
(Toronto, 1950); J.A . Swettenham, To Seize the Victory: The Canadian Corps in World
War l, (Toronto, 1965); A.J.M . Hyatt, “ Sir Arthur Currie and Conscription: A Soldier’s
View,” Canadian Historical Review, L, 3, September, 1969, 285-96; and R. Craig Brown
and Desmond Morton, “The Embarrassing Apotheosis of a ‘Great Canadian’: Sir Arthur
Currie’s Personal Crisis in 19 17,” CHR, LX, 1, March, 1979, 41-63.
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Montreal Tramways Com pany car 508, being used as an information and recruiting
point in V ictoria Square, for the 148 th Overseas Battalion ca. 19 16 . [Library and Archives
Canada PA 164705]

S.C. Mewburn, a Liberal member of Borden’s Union Government,
and its staff had grown from 919 employees in 1914 to more than
5700 administrators, clerks and typists. Since Hughes’ departure,
many of them worked in a separate Ministry of Overseas Forces with
headquarters in London.5 The voluntary recruiting that supported
the c e f through the first years of the war had been replaced by
conscription in 1917. On Armistice Day 105,016 conscripts were
available for service of whom 96,379 were on strength and 47,509 had
already proceeded overseas.6 One of Hughes’ inspirations, a “ Shell
Committee” to act as an agency for British munitions contracts
in Canada, had been undermined by scandal and replaced, late in
1915, by the Imperial Munitions Board, directed by businessman

5 On the Overseas Ministry see the fine history by Desmond Morton, of the Overseas
Ministry and the C E F 19 14-19 20, (forthcoming, Toronto 1982).
6 Nicholson, CEF, Appendix “E ,” SSI. Colonel Nicholson’s figure of 96,379 on
strength includes 16,296 draftees on unexpired harvest or compassionate leave. On
conscription and the implementation of the Military Service Act see, inter alia, J.L ,
Granatstein and J.M . Hitsman, Broken Promises. A History of Conscription in Canada
(Toronto, 1977) chs. 1-3; Robert Craig Brown and Ramsay Cook, Canada, 1896-1921.
A Nation Transformed (Toronto, 1974) ch. 13 and Brown, Borden, 2 chs. 8-10,
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Sir Joseph Flavelle and employing thousands of men and women in
munitions production.7
When Hughes issued his first chaotic call for troops the nation
was in the midst of a sharpening depression. Manufacturers reported
that their plants were operating at less than fifty percent of capacity.
Local correspondents of the Labour Gazette detailed the news of
young men on the move everywhere, going from town to town, looking
for a job. By 1918 the munitions workers in Flavelle’s factories were
only a tiny fraction of an industrial army, working overtime in plants
and mines, in a booming war economy. And Canada’s farmers were
producing and selling more agricultural products, at higher prices,
than they ever had before. By 1917 there were serious shortages of
manpower in the factories and on the farms of Canada, shortages as
threatening to the war effort as the reinforcement crisis in the c e f
which forced the passage of the Military Service Act.8
The manpower crisis had its roots in the hasty, unlimited
commitments made by the Borden Government in August, 1914. The
first was a decision to send whatever number of men were needed
overseas to fight. Characteristically, Hughes announced in New York
City on October 7, 1914, that “we could send enough men to add the
finishing touches to Germany without assistance either from England
or France.”9 In Halifax in December Borden was more moderate but
equally sanguine about his military manpower policy. Would, he was
asked, the expeditionary force eventually reach 100,000 men? “I prefer
to name no figure,” he replied. “If the preservation of our Empire
demands twice or thrice that number, we shall ask for them.”10
That was easy to do in the winter of 19 14 -15 . Borden, like his
counterparts in London and Paris still anticipated a quick, decisive
victory. And, up to that time, the countless hours he had spent
trying to boost production in Canada with orders from the Allies
for war material had yielded only disappointing results. The second

7 The history of the Imperial Minister’s Board is described in David Carnegie, The
History of Munitions Supply in Canada 19 14 - 19 18 (New York, 1925) and in Michael
Bliss’s excellent biography, A Canadian Millionaire: The Life and Business Times of
Sir Joseph Flavelle, Bart., 1888-1939 (Toronto, 1978), chs. 10 - 13 and 15.
8 For a brief sketch of the Canadian economy during the Great War see Brown and
Cook, Canada, 18 9 6 -19 21, ch. 12.
9 Cited, J.C . Hopkins, ed., Canadian Annual Review, 1914, (Toronto, 19 15), 217.
10 Cited, Brown, Borden, 2, 22.
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commitment made in August, 1914, to seize the opportunities of war
to revive the Canadian economy, remained an empty dream.
There was one more pledge that was easy to give in December,
1914. As Borden talked about raising men for the c e f , he observed
that “Canada will answer the call as readily and as fully as its men
[have] volunteered since August. There has not been, there will not
be, compulsion or conscription.”11
The commitments to raise as many men and produce as many
goods as necessary never changed during the Great War. But, as the
war dragged on, with such an appalling wastage of manpower, and
as war production steadily increased, it became ever more difficult to
recruit men for military-service. An examination of the administration
of military manpower policy during the war and its relationship to the
demand for labour in factories and on farms provides an interesting
insight into the history of the c e f . It is not possible, in this short essay,
to survey recruiting for all units of the c e f . Instead, we will analyse
the recruiting of infantry battalions, the largest single portion of the
Expeditionary Force. Unlike earlier discussions of this subject, our
study will be based on the effective military force, i.e., the men shipped
overseas, rather than on the men who enlisted for service, of whom tens
of thousands were discharged in Canada for a variety of reasons.12

The raising of the First Contingent under the personal direction of
Colonel Hughes was marked by confusion and chaos. Discarding a
prepared plan of mobilization in the Military Districts across Canada,
the Minister initially ordered each Local Militia unit commander
to enrol men for a divisional contingent and send nominal rolls
to Ottawa. There followed a flurry of amendments, additions and
contrary instructions which confused and exasperated the local

11 Ibid.
12 Colonel Duguid’s figures indicate that 616,557 enlisted in the C E F, either
voluntarily or by compulsion. Of these, 421,510 or 68.4% served overseas. Some
explanation of the difference may be found in remarks to the House of Commons
by Sir Edward Kemp on Ju ly 6, 19 17. He then explained that 76,000 of the 425,000
who had volunteered for service had been discharged in Canada. The largest groups
discharged were medically unfit (33,887), absentees struck off (13,081) and men “ not
likely to become efficient” (5,345). Duguid, Official History, 51; Canadian Annual
Review, 19 17, 307, 3 11.
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and District Officers as they tried to process the eager applicants
for overseas service. Eventually 30,621 men, including 19,299 in 17
c e f infantry battalions and another 1071 in a separately organized
battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, found their
way to the ships awaiting escort in Gaspe Basin.13
The men came from 130 Militia units from every region or
Canada. Significantly, more than sixty percent were raised in urban
areas and almost half of the men, 48.4%, came from western Canada
where the effects of the depression were most severe. Another 31.3%
came from heavily industrialized Ontario.14 Many of these soldiers
were among the tens of thousands of unemployed men who had been
looking for work in the summer of 1914. For them the army at least
would provide shelter, clothing, food and $ 1.10 a day. Even measured
against the hazards of military life, that was better than the prospect
of spending another bitter winter on the streets of Canada’s cities.
The other remarkable fact about the First Contingent was
that sixty percent of its men had been born in the British Isles.
Undoubtedly many of them had a more profound sense of the threat
the war posed to the Empire than did young Canadians of military
age. But unemployment also affected their decisions to enlist.
Canada was a nation of immigrants and more than ten percent of
the population came from the British Isles. A very large proportion
of these British immigrants were single males of military age and this
was especially true in the western provinces where the number and
proportion of single British-born males far exceeded that in any of the

13 See Appendix “ A ” and Duguid, Appendices, no. 84, 51-53.
14 In this paper we are not using the contemporary Canada Census distinction
between urban and non-urban populations. Instead, we use a much more limited
definition of urban recruiting that developed from recruiting patterns from 19 14 to
19 17, distinguishing between battalions recruited exclusively in defined urban areas
and those recruited over larger areas. So defined, our definition of urban includes
Quebec City and Montreal in Quebec; Toronto, Hamilton and London in Ontario;
Winnipeg and St. Boniface in Manitoba; Regina, Moose Jaw and Saskatoon in
Saskatchewan; Calgary and Edmonton in Alberta; and Vancouver, New Westminster
and Victoria in British Columbia. The pattern of recruiting is defined in the reports
of the Inspectors General on the battalions raised and because no battalions were
raised exclusively in urban areas in the Maritime region, all battalions from that
region have been classified as non-urban. Obviously, however, this classification,
which is necessary for consistent analysis, greatly undervalues the recruitment of
men in urban areas across Canada.
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eastern provinces.15 Unemployment, therefore, and a comparatively
large number of single British-born males in the population, in large
measure account for the extraordinary large contribution that the
western provinces made to the manpower of the First Contingent and
to the next phase of voluntary recruiting.
The second phase of voluntary recruiting, for First Contingent
reinforcements and a second contingent, began before the first men
had reached England. It was far more orderly than the first. Perhaps
the chaos at Valcartier convinced Hughes that a more systematic
approach was necessary; perhaps his absence in England, leaving
the administration of his Department, in the more capable hands of
Major-General W.G. Gwatkin, Chief of the General Staff, and MajorGeneral Eugene Fiset, the Deputy Minister, explained the change.
In any case, preliminary mobilization and training of recruits was
delegated to the local militia units in the Military Districts.
Over the next eleven months, through September, 1915, seventyone infantry battalions were authorized. Thirty-four of them not only
recruited a full battalion but also sent one or more drafts of some 250
men overseas. Only two, the 70th from Essex, Kent, Lambton and
Middlesex Counties in Ontario and the 57th from Quebec City, failed
to send a full strength battalion overseas. Again the largest number of
men came from western Canada, 41.4% of the total, closely followed
by Ontario’s contribution of 38.3%. Twelve percent of the men raised
in the second phase of recruiting came from Quebec in four French
and six English-speaking battalions. Eight percent of the men were
recruited in the Maritime Provinces in six full strength battalions,
two of which also sent extra drafts overseas.16
In the Quebec and western military districts a clear distinction
between recruiting in urban and non-urban areas developed at the
beginning of this period and it was beginning to emerge in Districts
One and Two in Ontario by the end of the period. Seventy percent of
the men raised in Quebec and sixty percent in the western provinces
were enrolled in battalions which recruited exclusively in urban areas. In
Ontario this type of recruiting did not begin until June 1915 and twenty
percent of the 34,352 infantrymen sent overseas from the Province in
this phase were raised in Toronto, Hamilton and London battalions.

15 See Tables i , ii and iii located in the Appendix at the end of the article. Also see
6th Census of Canada, 19 21, Vol. 2, Table 24 and Table 25.
16 See Table iv located in the Appendix at the end of the article.
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Figure 1: Battalion Recruiting Costs
Advertising

$

2,554
1,690

Dodgers, Letters, etc.
Street cars

464

Postage

220

Signs for depots, etc.

850

Office supplies, telephone, rent, etc.

930

Autos, repairs, etc.

656

Sundries

520

Brass & Bugle Bands

2,000

Two Field Kitchens

2,500

Misc.

1,000

TOTAL

$

13,384

This phase of recruiting also had its problems. Initial training was
hindered by lack of equipment for several battalions. “The training of
a unit cannot be pushed far when it has no equipment,” an InspectorGeneral reported of the 58th Battalion at Niagara-on-the-Lake. “ 1/3
of men have no clothing, 1/2 or more have no shirts. They are short of
boots and have no ammunition.” Severe weather, winter quartering and
the departure of local militia officers for overseas service further set back
training schedules as did a serious outbreak of spinal meningitis in units
at Toronto’s Canadian National Exhibition grounds and in Belleville
in the winter of 1914-15. Beyond that, the militia officers training
the raw recruits had to cope with major disciplinary problems. Three
hundred men had to be discharged from the 25th and 130 from the
26th battalions in the Maritimes. In several Ontario units a ten percent
wastage of manpower because of misconduct discharges was reported.
The 41st, a singularly ill-fated Quebec battalion, had 88 n c o ’s and other
ranks absent without leave on the day the Inspector-General appeared.17
The other responsibility of the militia units, mobilization of recruits,
was equally troublesome. Raising a battalion for overseas service was
an expensive business and, apart from the equipment supplied—in due
course!— by the Government of Canada, the costs had to be borne by
the local units. One estimate came to more than $13,000.18

17 RG 9, II, B5, vol. 5-7 (Inspectors-General Reports on C E F Battalions), Reports
on Battalions 19-86. On the 41st Battalion see Desmond Morton, “ The Short
Unhappy Life of the 41st Battalion. C E F ,” Queen’s Quarterly, L X X X I, Spring, 1974.
18 Canadian Annual Review, 19 16 , 308. See Figure i .
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Regimental funds were quickly dissipated and fund raising appeals
had to be launched in the community to cover the costs of recruiting.
Moreover, after the Spring of 1915, when casualty lists became a
daily feature in the press, the realization dawned that there was not
going to be a decisive battle: the war was going to be long and difficult,
and characterized by a shocking wastage of manpower at the Front.
Now some members of the Militia and self-appointed spokesmen for
the “better elements” in society banded together in Speakers Patriotic
Leagues and Recruiting Leagues to assist the Militia’s recruiting
efforts. But these organizations became increasingly outspoken in
their criticism of Militia recruiting. The job of mobilization and
training was too big and too expensive for the Militia to handle. Far
more men were going to be needed to fight the Kaiser and a much
greater and more efficient recruiting effort was necessary. The logic
of the argument, some spokesmen added, was a mere centralized
recruiting effort, more direct support from the Department of Militia
and Defence, and a scheme of national registration to rationalize
recruiting and, perhaps, as a prelude to conscription.19
The response from Ottawa was in exactly the opposite direction.
Why not, the Government’s new recruiting policy seemed to ask,
capitalize upon popular clamour for men by handing the responsibility
for raising battalions over to these zealous patriots? In the fall of 1915
the Department announced that henceforth the local regiments of
Militia would be bypassed in the recruiting effort and that individual
citizens and communities would be authorized to raise battalions on
their own if they would assume the costs of recruiting.
Given a direct role to play, the patriots, especially in the West
and in Ontario, responded with unprecedented energy. 123,966 men,
in 170 battalions, were sent overseas in the final phase of voluntary
recruiting from October 1915 to October 1917. Sixty battalions,
33.9% of the total, were raised in the western provinces and another
75 battalions, 42.4% of the total, in Ontario. Far fewer men were
recruited in the Maritimes and Quebec, but even in these regions
the battalions organized, fifteen in the Maritimes and thirteen in

19 On the Speakers Patriotic League and related organizations see Barbara
M. Wilson, editor, Ontario and the First World War, 19 14 -18 , A Collection of
Documents, (Toronto, 1977), xxix-xxxvii and 8 -21 and R. Matthew Bray, “ ‘Fighting
as an A lly’: The English-Canadian Patriotic Response to the Great War,” CHR,
LXI, 2, June, 1980, 141-68.
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Soldiers recruiting for the Canadians Buffs on Albert Street. Toronto, Ontario, 8 March 1916.
[Library and Archives Canada PA 072528]

Quebec, exceeded the number recruited by the Local Militia units
in the preceding phase.20 At first glance this patriotic phase of
recruiting, with the initiative in the hands of neither local nor central
military authorities, appears to have been a triumphant vindication
of voluntarism and local enthusiasm.
A closer look changes the perspective. 72,296 men, almost sixty
percent of the total, were raised in the first three months of this two
year period. Another thirty-eight percent were recruited in the next
six months, following Sir Robert Borden’s announcement on New
Year’s Day, 1916, that the authorized force level for the c e f had
been raised to a half-million men. Then, from July 1916 to October
1917, a mere 2810 men were raised and sent overseas in infantry
battalions. The last infantry battalion for c e f service, the 258th,
was organized in Quebec in April 1917 by Colonel Pierre-Edouard
Blondin, Postmaster General in Borden’s Government. It embarked
in October with 231 men. Blondin’s experience was not unique. The
last Maritime battalion, organized in August, 1916, sent 247 men
overseas and the last western battalion, the 251st, raised in Winnipeg,

20

In addition, seven special function Forestry and Railway battalions were raised
nationally or in more than one region.
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embarked with four officers and 168 other ranks.21 In short, in the
final phase of voluntary recruiting, enthusiasm peaked in the last three
months of 1915 and then quickly evaporated. Save for Blondin’s effort,
not a single infantry battalion was organized in the thirteen months
from November 1916 to the first call up of conscripts in January, 1918.
What had happened? A large part of the problem can be attributed
directly to the mode of recruiting authorized in the final phase. Lacking
central organization and control, the citizens raising battalions engaged
in ruinous competition for men. Three battalions were organized in
Toronto in December, 1915, another in January 1916 and six more
in February, 1916. In that same month at least six battalions were
recruiting in Winnipeg and three in Edmonton. In the Militia phase
of recruiting only two battalions, 2.8 per cent of the total, failed to
recruit to full strength. In the patriotic phase, 120 battalions, 73.6
per cent of the total, were sent overseas at less than full strength
and ten battalions, 6.1 per cent of the total, were disbanded. Even
appeals to men to enlist in special identity battalions seldom worked.
Thirty-eight such units, Highlanders, Sportsmen, Bantams, Chums,
Pals, Frontiersmen and others, were organized in this phase. Ten of
them, including five Highland battalions and one “Dry” battalion
from Winnipeg, were raised to full strength. But six others had to be
disbanded and the remainder were all under strength.
Unbridled competition had other devastating effects. As soon as men
were raised by a battalion’s organizers they were sent back to the streets
to recruit their friends. Even the most elemental training suffered. The
240th was raised in Lanark and Renfrew Counties in June, 1916. In
May, 1917 the Officer commanding Military District 3 wrote:
At the time this unit was formed, recruiting was not very brisk and
consequently the efforts of all of the officers were devoted to securing men.
As recruits were obtained they themselves were used as recruiting agents
especially among their own acquaintances. Training, therefore, was not
performed on any extensive scale. ... The Commanding Officer appeared
to consider training of very secondary importance and he devoted much
of his time to recruiting both for his own and Forestry Battalions.22

The battalion was sent overseas two weeks later with 389 men.

21 Public Archives of Canada, RG 24, vols. 1344-54, File HQ 593-3-25.
22 PAC, RG 9, II BS, Vol. 7. (Inspector General’s Reports).
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Discipline suffered even more. The Inspectors General’s reports
tell a dismal tale. The 145th and 146th, both in training at Valcartier
in the late summer of 1916, each lost a hundred or more men in five
weeks between inspections. The 180th, an Ontario battalion, had
336 men away without leave when it was inspected and 300 men
missed parade when the 199th, a Quebec battalion, was inspected. A
western battalion, the 210th, recruited 1020 men, 732 were left when
it was inspected; 152 had been discharged and 59 had deserted. Two
months later, almost 300 more had disappeared. Only 500 officers
and men embarked for overseas.23 Understrength, poorly trained,
lacking discipline the Inspectors General repeatedly recommended
that battalions raised in this phase of recruiting be sent overseas as
drafts to be amalgamated into previously organized battalions.
But an unorganized recruiting system and competition between
battalions for men were not the only problems encountered by recruiters
in the patriotic phase. By the winter of 19 15-19 16 the Government’s
plans for domestic war production were falling into place and there
was a steadily rising demand for manpower in the agricultural and
industrial sectors of the economy. An Inspector General noted that
recruiting for the 232nd, a Saskatchewan battalion, had been “very
poor.” “ The reason assigned, [was] not so much the scarcity of men in
the country but to the demand for labour at an excessively high rate
of wages.” 24 This was true across rural Canada and especially in the
west where wages for farm labour skyrocketed in the latter war years
and elaborate schemes were developed to import agricultural workers
from the United States.25
It was no less true in Canada’s cities where, as in the earlier phases
of recruiting, the recruitment of men for the c e f was concentrated. By
late 1915 war contracts were accumulating in ever increasing number;
the Shell Committee had been replaced by an agency of the British
Ministry of Munitions, the Imperial Munitions Board, and hundreds

23
24

PAC, RG 9, II BS, vols. 5-7.
PAC, RG 9, II BS, vol. 7.
25 See The Agricultural Gazette of Canada, III, 1916, 245-48, 351; 19 17, 387-93,
493; and V, 1918, 864-67, 940-44 and Eleventh Annual Report of the Department
of Agriculture of the Province of Saskatchewan, Regina, 1916. After the entry of the
United States into the war in 19 17 the supply of American farm labour was greatly
restricted. As partial compensation for that, and for the movement of agrarian
labourers into the industrial work force in Canada, a “ Soldiers of the Soil” movement
was organized in most provinces in 19 17 -19 18 .
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of contracts for military supplies for the Canadian Government were
being distributed by the War Purchasing Commission.26 The result
was a remarkable explosion of industrial activity in every region of
Canada, accompanied by corresponding growth in other sectors of
the economy from mining to transportation to finance.
Because government statisticians used different bases to measure
the number of industrial workers employed before 1917, no reliable
figures on the size of the industrial workforce are available for the early
war years. But Department of Labour estimates of unemployment
among unionized workers indicate unemployment of union workers
was below the national average in Halifax, St. John, Toronto,
Winnipeg, Regina, and Edmonton in at least seven of the eleven
quarters from June 1916 to December 1918. Other indicators point
to a similar trend. Between 1915 and 1917 the average rate of return
on capital invested in manufacturing increased in every province; it
doubled in Quebec, more than doubled in Nova Scotia and Ontario
and almost tripled in Manitoba and Alberta. Using 1917 as a base
year, value added to manufacturing increased more than 10 percent
nationwide in 1918 and by 12 percent in Ontario and Saskatchewan,
16 per cent in New Brunswick and 35 per cent in British Columbia.27
Crude as these indicators are, they strongly suggest that industrial
production, and its consequent draw on manpower in the urban
areas of Canada, rose sharply from 1916 on and cut deeply into the
potential manpower supply for military service.
The organizers of infantry battalions, therefore, not only had
to compete for men among themselves, but also with the factories
and shops of Canada. Beyond that, as the Canadian Corps grew
in size and responsibility, opportunities for enlistment in other
branches of the service, many of them considerably less risky than the
infantry, expanded greatly, as did recruiting activity for the British
flying services, the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying
Corps.28 The result was a precipitate decline in enrolment in infantry

26 See, for example, RG 14, D2, vol. 37, Sessional Paper 149, “ Second Report of the
War Purchasing Commission, Jan 1, 19 17 to March 31, 19 18 ” which lists the bidders
for and the 2467 contracts awarded during that period.
27 Calculated from quarterly reports in the Labour Gazette, 19 16 -19 19 and from
statistics on manufacturing in Canada Year Book, 19 22-23, 4 15-16 .
28 See Gilbert N. Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada Vol.1, Ottawa, 1952 and
S.F. Wise, Canadian Airmen and the First World War; The Official History of the
Royal Canadian A ir Force Vol. 1, Toronto, 1980.
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battalions in urban areas, ending with the meagre contribution, after
June, 1916, of 172 men from Winnipeg and 297 from Toronto.
Rural areas, where farmers were constantly badgered by the
Government to increase their acreage and production did no better.
The five non-urban battalions raised in Ontario after June 1916
contributed a total of 112 4 men, the strength or a single battalion, to
overseas service. In western Canada only one battalion, the 249th in
Saskatchewan, was recruited after June 1916. In the following year it
sent 550 men to Quebec for further training.29
But, if the Government’s military manpower and wartime
production policies were working against each other, and if infantry
recruiting had collapsed by the late spring of 1916, why did the
Government wait for another year to introduce the Military Service
Act? Many factors delayed the decision. The Government, for
example, seems to have based its military manpower policy upon
monthly enlistment figures which grossly understated the forthcoming
infantry manpower crisis by taking no account of wastage through
discharge or desertion during the training of men in Canada,30 but
even the use of embarkation rather than enlistment statistics could
have been misleading. Because of the long period of time between the
date when a battalion was recruited and it embarked, thousands of men
recruited in late 1915 and early 1916 were only being sent overseas in
late 1916 and early 1917. Thus, Borden and his colleagues could easily
have concluded in the spring of 1917 that the infantry manpower crisis
was less serious than, in fact, it was. Finally, as depressing as earlier
casualty rates were, it was only in 1917 that the fully developed Corps,
fighting as a complete unit, suffered casualties at a truly alarming rate.
Borden made the fateful decision to impose conscription during
his trip home from the Imperial War Cabinet meetings in the late
spring of 1917. At those meetings, and in private talks with Lloyd
George and other members of the British Government, he had become
privy, for the first time during the war, to the secret information and
projections of the British on the duration of the war. Undoubtedly the
sombre news influenced his decision. Even more was he influenced by
the tragic spectacle of row upon row upon row of bedridden wounded
Canadian boys in the hospitals he visited in France and Britain.
His commitment to their cause and their sacrifice was total and

29

PAC, RG 9, II BS, vol. 7.
30 See footnote 12.
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Cross raised to the memory of the 48th
Battalion CEF. This cross was raised to
protest the decision to disband the 48th
Battalion (also called the 3rd Canadian
Pioneer Battalion from January 1916)
in April-M ay 19 17 , and disperse its
personnel throughout the Canadian
Corps. [Library and Archives Canada PA
005022]

unquestioning. He was answering the “call from the wounded,” “the
men in the trenches and those who have fallen” he explained on May
18, 1917 when he announced that there would be conscription.31
The announcement touched off a furious debate in the House of
Commons. The passage of the Military Service Act and the subsequent
formation by Borden of a Union Government to implement it have
been the subject of equally intense argument among politicians and
historians ever since, as they have calculated the effects of conscription
upon French-English relations, farmers, trade unions and the Liberal
and Conservative Parties.
Some facts are beyond dispute. Among the men of military age
in Canada the response was overwhelmingly negative. Of the 401,882
Class i registrants, males aged 20 to 32 who were single or widowers
with no children, no less than 93.7 per cent immediately applied for
exemption. And tens of thousands more failed to register and became
defaulters. The number of registrants who volunteered for service or
reported by order in the initial phase of implementation of the Act
was tiny, 4.5 per cent of registrants nationally, varying from 10.5 per
cent in British Columbia to 1.6 per cent in Quebec. In every province
31

Brown, Borden, 2, chs. 7-10.
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and region of Canada, not just in Quebec, it was evident that popular
enthusiasm for military service had been bled dry.32
Many advocates of conscription argued that a nationally directed
compulsory military manpower policy was the only way to achieve
a balanced allotment of military responsibilities between sectors of
the economy and among regions of the country. Some, playing upon
long-standing animosities between French and English Canada,
and obsessed by Quebec’s low rate of contribution to the voluntary
recruiting effort,33 went further to claim that the Military Service
Act would, at last, force French Canadians to assume their share
of the military burden. Driven by the passions of war, few were
prepared to concede that demographic and historical factors went
far to explain why Quebec (and, to a lesser extent the Maritime
Provinces) had contributed comparatively fewer soldiers to the war
effort than Ontario and the western provinces. As noted above, the
voluntary recruiting system, at least in its first and second phases,
was dependent upon the local militia units and was heavily biased in
favour of recruiting single men. The significantly higher proportion
of single males of military age, both native Canadians and British
immigrants, in the West and in Ontario, and the deep roots of
the militia in Ontario society help to account for the high rates of
recruitment in both regions. By contrast, the proportion of males of
military age who were married was well above the national average in
Quebec and the Maritime Provinces and the militia exercised much
less influence in the societies of the Maritime Provinces and had
frittered away by neglect whatever modest attractions it had once had
in French Canadian society.34 The bias towards recruiting in urban
areas also helps to explain why French Canadians failed to respond
to the voluntary recruiting effort. Not only did the vast majority
of French Canadians live outside the two largest cities of Quebec,35
but only one quarter of the battalions recruited in the Montreal and
32 See Canada, House of Commons, Sessional Papers, 1919, no. 246, 86. Also see
Table v located in the Appendix at the end of the article.
33 Across Canada 12.33% of the military age group (males 15 to 44 years of age in
19 11) had enlisted in infantry battalions and embarked for overseas service before
the implementation of the Military Service Act. B y region the rates were: Maritimes,
9.96%; Quebec, 4.69%; Ontario, 14.42% and Western Canada, 15.52%. See Table I
located in the Appendix at the end of the article.
34 See Morton, Ministers and Generals, passim and Canada and War. A Military
and Political History, Toronto, 1981, chs. 1-2.
35 See 5th Census of Canada, 19 1 1 , vol. 2, 357-65.
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Quebec districts sought to attract French Canadian recruits.36 In
short, in the Maritime provinces, and even more so in Quebec, the
smaller proportion of single males of military age in the population,
a concentration on urban recruiting and a legacy of neglect of French
Canadians in the Militia go far to account for the failure of men in
those regions to respond to the voluntary recruiting effort.
Conscription did tend to balance out the military manpower
contribution of the regions. Though still below the national average
of 5.6 per cent of the military age group made available for service
under the Military Service Act, Quebec’s contribution of 5 per cent
matched Ontario’s 5.1 per cent and approximated the 5.5 per cent
contribution from the Western Provinces.37 But it was grudgingly
given. The number of defaulters was exceedingly high, even when
account is taken of confusion in the counting and classification of
defaulters in the Hull office of Military District 3 and in Districts
4 and 5.38 Only 1.6 per cent of Quebec’s Class i registrants reported
for service; 98 per cent applied for exemptions. And Appeal Tribunals
rejected only 9.3 per cent of exemption claims as compared with 13 per
cent in the Maritime and Western regions and 15 per cent in Ontario.39
Too much, however, can be made of Quebec’s, or French
Canada’s opposition to conscription, implying, as it does, that there
was substantially more support for the Military Service Act in other
regions of the country. That doubtless was true among the politicians
supporting the Union Government and the voters in Ontario and
Western Canada in the 1917 election. It certainly was not true among
the Class i registrants in any region of the country. Among them, one
broadly based group, the farmers of Canada, illustrates the point.
In comparative terms they had been left alone during the voluntary
phases of recruiting and they were no more willing to be coerced than
they had been to be coaxed into military service. Promised exemptions

36 In contrast, in New Brunswick, where recruiting was not concentrated in
identifiable urban areas, five of the seven infantry battalions contained large numbers
of Acadian recruits.
37 See Table vi located in the Appendix at the end of the article.
38 See Sessional Paper 246, 1919, 138-40; 145-48.
39 See Table v located in the Appendix at the end of the article. It should not be
assumed that reference to Quebec in this paragraph refers only to French-speaking
Canadians living in the Province. The statistics available for administration of the
M SA in Quebec do not differentiate between French and English speaking registrants.
Moreover, the 98% rate of claims for exemptions indicates the unpopularity of
conscription among all Class I registrants.
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by the Unionist Government candidates in the 1917 election campaign,
97.4 per cent of the farmers who were Class i registrants applied for
exemptions. Only 12.6 per cent of those claims were refused by the
Tribunals established under the Military Service Act.40
The Government’s solicitous regard for agrarians apparently came
to an abrupt end, however, when Sir Robert Borden announced the
cancellation of all exemptions and the call up of all 20-22 year old
Class i registrants in April, 1918. Farmers in every region of the country
were outraged and charged that the exemption premise had been a
cheap political trick. It mattered not that the call up was Borden’s
response to the roll back of Allied armies before the German spring
offensive on the Western Front. A Nova Scotia farmer complained to
his Member of Parliament that “this conscripting farmers is the worst
slur on the conservative government yet.”41 District registrars for the
Military Service Act reported that the cancellation of exemptions was
“generally unpalatable,” “created a measure of consternation” and a
“ feeling of resentment” among farmers.42
But the effect of the cancellation upon the farming community
was, in fact, not as severe as it appeared. Registrars were instructed
to take care to avoid conscripting hardship cases, to grant and renew
harvest leaves, and to grant leaves of absence on compassionate
grounds. More significant still, registrars were ordered “to call the men
with urban addresses in priority to those living in country districts.”
Reflecting upon the effect of the cancellation in his final report, the
registrar in Halifax “did not observe that the farming industry was
seriously handicapped by this call, and the fishing industry was very
slightly affected. Large industrial concerns in the mining and steel
centres were more seriously affected.”43
The otherwise comprehensive report of the Director of the
Military Service Act does not indicate how many young farmers
were called for service as a result of Borden’s announcement. But
if we assume a constant proportion of 20-22 year old farmers to all
20-22 year olds with exemptions, 31.9 per cent, through the process
of cancellation and calling up, then only 17,146 young farmers were

40 See Table vii located in the Appendix at the end of the article.
41 Provincial Archives of Nova Scotia, M.G. 2, E.N. Rhodes Papers, vol. 580, no.
8951, letter to Rhodes, May 9, 1918.
42 Sessional Paper no. 246, 1919, 139, 149, 136.
43 Ibid., 132, 17, 136.
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called up.44 If we add farmers who reported for service and who had
exemption claims denied to those whose exemptions were cancelled,
42,098 farmers, 25.3 per cent of farmers who registered, were called
for service under the M.S.A. 71,363 non-farmers reported for service
or had their exemptions denied or cancelled, 29.1 per cent of non
farmer registrants. In western Canada the bias towards farmers was
much sharper. 23.3 per cent of western farmer registrants and 39.3
per cent of non-farmers were called for service.45
Thus, if the administration of the Military Service Act tended to
bring more balance into the manpower contributions of the regions of
Canada, it was less effective in balancing the contribution of farmers
and non-farmers to the military manpower effort. In fact, the more
liberal policy toward farmers that existed during the voluntary
recruiting period was codified in the regulations made under the
Military Service Act both before and after the call up of the 20
22 age group. In part the favouritism of agrarians was accidental;
voluntary recruiting tended to centre upon urban areas of high
population density. In part it was a matter of design; ever increasing
agricultural production for export was an essential component of the
Government’s war policy.
But so too was industrial production for the war effort and our
examination of the recruiting of infantry reveals that the conflict
between military manpower policy and industrial policy surfaced
during the winter and early spring of 1915-1916, long before the
agrarians raised their powerful protest against the Military Service
Act. Indeed, given the patterns of voluntary recruiting, that conflict
undermined the voluntary recruiting system and precipitated the
conscription crisis.
The history of Canadian manpower policy in the Great War,
climaxing in the conscription crisis, has been characterized by a
distinguished military historian as a story of “broken promises.”46 That
it was; from Borden’s 1914 pledge that there would be no conscription
to the 1917 election promise to exempt farmers. Yet, from another
perspective, it could just as convincingly be called a story of unrequited

44 Total 20-22 with exemptions = 104,149; total 20-22 farmers with exemptions
= 33,284 or 31.96%; total 20-22 exemptions cancelled = 65,610 (31.96% total =
17,146); Total 20-22 gp. Called for service = 53,649 (31.96% total = 17,146).
45 Calculated from Tables vi and vii located in the Appendix at the end of the article.
46 Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, chs. 1-3 .
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South African monument with recruiting
sign. Toronto, Ontario, 1 September 19 15.
[Library and Archives Canada PA 071675]

faith: faith, initially, that the war would quickly end; faith that the
patriotic response of the people of Canada would enable the country to
send as many men as necessary to the Front and, at the same time, be
a major supplier of war material; faith that even with an inadequate
bureaucracy and little planning somehow, someway, everything would
come out right. Most especially, faith in the principle of voluntarism.
In the end, faith was not enough. Applied to the military manpower
policy in an ever more decentralized system of voluntary recruiting, it
was dashed by the duration of the war, the appalling wastage of men
at the Front, and the Canadian Government’s own wartime economic
policies. But even when coercion became necessary, the legacy of faith
in voluntarism tempered the coercive nature of the Military Service
Act. Under the liberal exemptions policy in the Act, 86.8 per cent of
all claims for exemption were allowed: only 28 per cent of all Class i
registrants were called for military service.
Reflecting upon Borden’s decision in 1916 to raise the authorized
force level of the c e f to 500,000 men, Sir Thomas White, the Minister
of Finance, wrote that “We simply went on faith, feeling instinctively
that means could be found to enable us to carry it out.”47 That simple
47 Cited, Brown, Borden, 2, 34.
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confession spoke volumes about Canada’s military manpower policy,
from the guns of August to Armistice Day.
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APPEN DIX
Table i: Military Age Groups
Male Population
Years Old in

15-44

1911

15-44

Province or Region

Male
Population

% Total

PEI

19715

1

Nova Scotia

111184

5.9

New Brunswick

77904

4.1

Maritime Provinces

208803

11.1

Quebec

442703

23.4

Ontario

638079

33.9

Manitoba

132571

7

Saskatchewan

167608

8.9

Alberta

129444

6.9

British Columbia

162229

8.6

Western Canada

591852

31.3

CANADA

1888825

100

Source: Canada Year Book, 19 13 , 82-84.
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Table 11: Military Age Groups

Males

15 and Over - Canadian, British and Foreign Born in 1911

Province or Region
PEI
Nova Scotia
New Brunswick
Maritime Provinces
Quebec
Ontario
Manitoba
Saskatchewan
Alberta
British Columbia
Western Canada
CANADA

Number
31370
166 ,870
116626
314866
627002
925948
172989
206 ,889
162346
205657
747 ,881
2623820

%Canadian
Born
96.68
89.27
92.8
91. 32
89
71.42
43.21
38.61
31.3
28.78
35.38
67.68

%British
Born
2.61
7.58
4.35
5.88
5.46
19.42
30.5
23.9
25.22
34.59
28.65
17.08

%Foreign
Born
0.7
3.17
2.84
2.81
5.54
9.16
26.29
37.49
43.48
36.62
35.96
15.24

Source: 6th Census of Canada, 19 2 1, Vol. 2, Table 24, 118-19.

Table ill: Military Age Groups

Single Males

15 and Over - Canadian, British and Foreign Born in 1911

Province or Region
PEI
Nova Scotia
New Brunswick
Maritime Provinces
Quebec
Ontario
Manitoba
Saskatchewan
Alberta
British Columbia
Western Canada
CANADA

Number
12952
72600
50840
136392
287115
380 ,689
82660
110505
91174
84 ,492
368 ,831
1175285

%Canadian
Born
97.79
90.93
93.92
92.69
90.59
75.1
55.76
44.92
37.51
39.17
44.19
71.18

%British
Born
0.67
5.59
2.9
4.12
3.96
16.29
23.76
18.93
21.34
32.77
23.78
14.24

%Foreign
Born
1.54
3.49
3.17
3.18
5.44
8.61
20.47
36.14
41.16
28.09
32.03
14.59

Source: Ibid.
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Table iv : Strength of Infantry Battalions Raised in Canada Before Military Service Act
T im e period o f
O rganization
Full plus
Total no. B attalions

drafts

Full

Full to half
strength

Less than h a lf
strength

16

1x

32

2

25

52

7

1

13**

29***

21

7

D isbanded

A u g - S ep 1914
F i r s t C o n tin g e n t

x 1 7 th B a tta lio n h a d s a ilin g
s tr e n g t h o f 6 6 5 . D u g u i d
A p p e n d ic e s , # 8 4 , p p . 5 0 -5 1 .

17 T o ta l B n s.
O c t 1 4 - S e p 15
37
71 T o ta l B n s.
O c t 15 - D e c 15

85 T o ta l B n s.

J a n 16 - J u n 16
2*

+ In c lu d e s 5 s p e c ia l f u n c tio n
b a tta lio n s ra is e d a c r o s s C a n a d a .

72 T o ta l B n s.
F r o m Ju l 16

x E x c lu d e s 2 b a tta lio n s r a i s e d fo r
S ib e ria i n 19 18.
3****

8

2
+ I n c lu d e s 2 s p e c ia l f u n c tio n
b a tta lio n s ra is e d a c ro s s C a n a d a .

13 T o ta l B n s.

258 Total Bns.

39

86

87

36

10

Source: Calculated from RG 24, vols. 1344-54, File HQS 93-3-25 (Embarkation Reports)
* Both special functions.
** Two special functions
*** One special function.
**** Two special functions.
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